INDR editorial March 2016
By Ask Vest Christiansen and John Gleaves
On 14 February 2016, Nikita Kamaev died of a “massive heart attack”. Kamaev was the executive director of Russia's anti-doping agency, RUSADA, from 2011 to 2015. His death came 10 weeks after he stepped down as head of RUSADA since he knew that he could not continue on the post after WADA on 18 November 2015 had declared the organisation “non-compliant” with the WADC. This twist of fate in itself should cause some raised eyebrows. But there is more to it.
On 21 November 2015, Kamaev made contact with David Walsh, the Irish journalist that spent a good number of years trying to bring down Lance Armstrong. In an article in The Sunday Times Walsh explains how the recent doping controversies in Russia had prompted Kamaev to begin a memoir, and he wanted to know if Walsh would co-author a book with him where they were to reveal everything about the Russian anti-anti-doping system (not a typo!). Besides being the head of RUSADA for five years, and a member of the UCI’s medical commission, Kamaev had worked as a young scientist at a secret laboratory in the USSR Institute of Sports Medicine. The first e-mail to Walsh came only three days after WADA’s report on the Russian anti-doping system had effectively closed down the Russian agency due to their lack of compliance. In a follow-up e-mail to Walsh Kamaev explained that he “had documents, confidential sources, correspondence with various international and Russian agencies, and he suggested that what was revealed in the German TV documentary was nothing compared to what he had” (Walsh, 2016).
Over the years, many have expressed doubts about the efficiency of RUSADA’s testing programme. Russia’s sweep of the women’s 1,500-metre race at the 2005 Athletics World Championship in Helsinki was reminiscent of the EPO-fuelled mid-1990s, when the Gewiss-Ballan cycling team took all three podium spots of the 1994 edition of the Fleche Wallonne. As we now know RUSADA did test its athletes, and athletes received anti-doping sanctions. However, those who had the potential to win at Olympic competitions were protected. Before the winter Games in Vancouver in 2010 the Russian Ministry of Sports apparently had a list “of at least 15 athletes, cross-country skiers, biathletes, others, that were untouchable” (Walsh, 2016). RUSADA were not to test them and if they did, the athletes in question would receive warnings on when this would happen.
Nevertheless, a doping problem surfaced in Russian biathlon. This was not to the satisfaction of Vitaly Mutko, the Russian Minister for Sport and President of the Russian Football Union (and member of the FIFA Executive Committee as well as chairperson of Russia’s organising committee for the Football World Cup in 2018). When the problem came to his knowledge, he, according to Walsh, said that: “we don’t care about WADA, we don’t care about international sports federations. We are in Russia and the Russian ministry decides who should be sanctioned and who should be heroes and wins medals” (Walsh, 2016). It was shortly hereafter that Kamaev took over as chief executive of RUSADA, and part of his job was to ensure that RUSADA was more in alignment with Mutko and the Ministry of Sport. One of Kamaev’s first moves involved sacking Vitaly Stepanov, the idealistic doping control officer who had overheard Mutko’s tirades on how WADA should not be in charge of anti-doping in Russia, and who also happened to be married to the elite 800-meter runner Yuliya Stepanova. After Stepanov was kicked out, he and Yuliya went on to tell the German ARD journalist Hajo Seppelt what they knew. Their story was the basis for the ARD documentary and later the stepping stone for the two WADA independent commission reports on the Russian doping system.
Kamaev and Walsh never went on to discuss the details of the book on Skype, as suggested by Kamaev. Walsh found that Kamaev’s English was not good enough (which seems to be an odd excuse) and that he additionally was too much part of the Russian system, wherefore Welsh did not want to work with him. It was subsequently stated by Kamaev's former boss at RUSADA, Ramil Khabriev, that Kamaev had renounced on the idea to write the book, because an "American publisher had demanded too much influence over its contents” (Ellingworth, 2016). Walsh had proposed an English publisher, so this suggests that Kamaev had sent the invitation to co-author his book to at least two more people other than Walsh.
We know this because on the same day, November 21, 2015, that Kamaev sent the first e-mail to Walsh he also contacted an INDR member and posed the exact same question he posed to Walsh; namely if he wanted to co-author a book and that he had much more documents to reveal than was exposed in the German documentary. Kamaev’s conversations with the INDR member went further than his conversations with Walsh. They spoke twice on Skype and had arranged to meet first in Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia, and then in Moscow. On both occasions, Kamaev seemed in great shape and never complained about any health issues. However, both agreements to meet were postponed due to a heavy loaded schedule on the INDR member. Also, we have seen documentation that Kamaev had no plans on resign on writing the book as Ramil Khabriev told the press. Still on 29 January 2016, a little more than two weeks before his death, Kamaev vigorously worked for the project to be realised and continued to write notes.
Kamaev’s death came after he returned from cross-country skiing. Apparently, he complained about chest pain and died soon after of what RUSADA called “a massive heart attack”. He was an active 52 year old man who also had a holiday home in Spain where he cycled a lot. On Skype, Kamaev had encouraged the INDR member that the two should also meet with Vyacheslav Sinev, RUSADA’s general director between 2008 and 2010. According to Kamaev, Sinev had further illuminating documents that the INDR member could see and which they could use for the book. However, Sinev died on 3 February 2016 of “causes still unknown”, and Kamaev’s surprising death followed just 11 days later. So now, there will be no exchange of viewpoints, knowledge, or documents. What Kamaev had and how far it could have reached is guesswork. All we know is that the book that both David Walsh and the INDR member was offered to co-author will never be realised.
The Russian case is a good example of how sport is still intertwined with politics on the large scale. The big arms race that mirrored the arms race of the Cold War evidently continues to play a role and shows that research into doping isn’t just of marginal interest. This fact is underscored in an enlightening commentary by Jörg Krieger, from the German Sport University Cologne, on how the knowledge of (sports) history can help understand the recent events in Russia. With the title: Back to the Future: Comments on Sport History´s Contribution to Understanding Existing Anti-Doping Strategies, Krieger also in his commentary tells the story of the first athlete ever to be tested in an Olympic context – an event that took place at the Olympic Winter Games in Grenoble in 1968.
We are also pleased to present a thought provoking commentary by our Australia based colleague Professor Ross Coomber of Griffith Criminology Institute, Griffith University, Australia. In his commentary entitled Understanding that Performance and Image Enhancing Drug Markets are not all the same and why this matters, Coomber draws attention to the importance of not simply attributing (online or material) drug markets with often disproven stereotypical characteristics of traditional drug markets and drug dealers. In understanding both the new “crypto drug markets based in the recesses of the Deep Web or the Darknet“ or local non-elite local PIED markets such stereotyping is argued to be unhelpful as it misses important variance among suppliers of PIED - especially in relation to those that are closer to social suppliers - and as a consequence increases the risk of over criminalising them in line with those darker stereotypes.Also, we want to congratulate INDR member Elena Atienza-Macías, University of Deusto, Spain, who recently defended her PhD thesis devoted to the study of legal and ethical implications of the use of doping practices in sport. You will find a summary of her thesis included in the newsletter.
As most INDR members will know, the report of the Cycling Independent Reform Commission (CIRC) was published in March last year. It notably included a heavy critique of the former UCI president Hein Verbruggen. Verbruggen himself did not feel he had a fair say in that process and has in June 2015 he published evidence to support his claim that the report in his view was “totally flawed”. If interested, you can access the comprehensive material via this link: http://www.verbruggen.ch/about-this-site/
Finally, we want draw your attention to a highly interesting text by INDR member Ian Ritchie. His piece entitled: “Cops and Robbers? The Roots of Anti-Doping Policies in Olympic Sport” is published in the online magazine Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective. As with Krieger’s commentary, Ritchie’s historical approach helps shed light on current events.
We hope you enjoy the articles, and (if you live on the northern hemisphere) the spring that is just around the corner.
References
Ellingworth, J. (2016). Russian doping official planned book before sudden death.
Retrieved from bigstory.ap.org/article/d207f87cca9f4f0bbe4f79d235bda5ca/russian-doping-official-planned-book-sudden-death
Walsh, D. (2016, 21 February). What was Russian doping boss going to reveal? Nikita Kamaev promised to expose Russian drug cheats. Last week he died, aged 52. The Sunday Times.